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1 Introduction
Firm-specic human capital can improve rm productivity, create rents, and increase
the retention of workers. Consequently, there is little doubt that it is important for
rms to motivate workers to invest in rm-specic human capital. For the most part,
contract theories have proven useful in informing us how to design a wage contract
to encourage this type of investment.
Although contract theories are typically abstracted from outside markets, wage
contracts are obviously also important in determining the prices for labor. Market
competition must then inuence these contracts. That is, when rms write contracts,
they must consider not only the incentives of employed workers, but also the compe-
tition to attract potential applicants. How does this competitive pressure inuence
the wage contract o¤ered in the market? Further, what are the welfare consequences
of competition when a rm must motivate its workers?
This paper analyzes an equilibrium wage contract when a rm must motivate
workers to invest in match-specic human capital in a competitive search model. As
emphasized in Albrecht (2011), the competitive search model is a particularly useful
benchmark because it is known to attain the constrained optimal allocation1. Any
deviation from the standard competitive search model then allows us to identify the
source of ine¢ ciency2. This paper investigates a possible reason for ine¢ ciency when
a rm must motivate workers to invest in match-specic human capital in a frictional
labor market.
We summarize our main results as follows. If match-specic human capital is
not critical for production, we show that market competition does not interfere with
the incentive contract. In order to motivate workers, the di¤erences between the
wages for successful workers and those for failed workers must be large. Conversely,
1Several studies (e.g., Moen (1997), Shimer (1996), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b), Shi (2001),
Shimer (2005) and Menzio and Shi (2011)) establish that the competitive search equilibrium attains
the constrained optimal under several di¤erent environments.
2For example, Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006), Guerrieri (2008), Galenianos and Kircher
(2009), Galenianos, Kircher and Gabor (2011), and Delacroix and Shi (2013) analyze the possible
source of ine¢ ciencies using competitive search models.
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the average level of wage payment is important for the competition to attract risk-
neutral workers. Hence, it is possible to design a wage contract that simultaneously
incorporates both incentives and advertisement. We then show that the equilibrium
wage contract can induce optimal e¤ort and optimal labor market tightness under
the constraint of search friction, which we refer to as the rst best.
However, if match-specic human capital is critical for production, the result
signicantly changes. Because the failure to obtain match-specic human capital
lowers the rent from their long-term relationship, it diminishes the reasons for the
rm and the worker to maintain their relationship. Because workers can simply
walk away from the rm, the value of unemployed workers is the lowest bound of
a punishment that a rm can impose on workers when they fail to obtain match-
specic human capital. We show that when match-specic human capital is critical,
this constraint for the lowest bound is more likely to bind, and the value of the
failed workers then equals that of unemployed workers. As a result, the equilibrium
contract is essentially a version of an e¢ ciency wage contract.
However, unlike a standard e¢ ciency wage model, the wage contract in our model
must play a dual role; namely, advertisement and motivation. Note that when the
value of the failed workers is determined by that of the unemployed workers, the
wage payment for successful workers must inuence both the average level of the
wage payments and the di¤erence between the wage payments for successful workers
and failed workers. We show that a workers incentive compatibility condition and a
rms zero-prot condition bring about a trade-o¤ between the workersprobability
of nding a job and their investment e¤ort after locating a partner. That is, a rm
must pay a higher wage to induce greater e¤ort. However, because the promise
of a higher wage reduces rms prots, only a smaller number of rms can enter
the market, which reduces labor market tightness and, therefore, the probability of
workers nding a job.
Because of this trade-o¤, it is impossible to increase equilibrium e¤ort and a job-
nding probability at the same time. Hence, both the equilibrium e¤ort level and
a job-nding probability are lower than the rst best. We then question whether
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the competitive search equilibrium can attain the second best, which maximizes the
social welfare subject to a workers incentive compatibility condition and a rms
zero-prot condition. For this purpose, we examine whether a tax on labor market
tightness can increase welfare under the competitive search equilibrium. Because the
tax benets can be used to nance unemployment benets, the only role of the labor
market tightness tax is to direct unemployed workers to select a labor market with
less labor market tightness. If the competitive search equilibrium attains the second
best, the optimal tax rate should be 0. However, we nd that a slight increase in
the tax from 0 can improve welfare.
We identify two potential sources of ine¢ ciency: a misdirected e¤ect and a nega-
tive externality e¤ect. As Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) and Guerrieri (2008) argue,
only wage contracts that maximize the utility of unemployed workers survive in a
competitive search equilibrium. However, the social planner needs to care not only
about the utility of unemployed workers, but also about that of employed workers.
We show that maximizing the utility of unemployed workers also maximizes social
welfare, but only if workersex post e¤ort is optimal. Therefore, if workersex post
e¤ort is less than optimal, it is possible to improve welfare by providing additional
rent to successful workers to induce e¤ort. However, because this reduces the job-
nding probability, it lowers the utility of unemployed workers. Therefore, this type
of wage contract cannot survive in a competitive economy. Thus, when the wage
must play an advertisement and an incentive role at the same time, the competition
to attract unemployed workers forces rms to o¤er that wage that improves the ex
ante utility of workers at the expense of ex post utility. We refer to this asmisdirected
e¤ect.
The competition to attract workers also has another e¤ect. The competition to
attract workers increases the utility of unemployed workers, which makes it costly for
other rms to provide workers with appropriate incentives. Hence, when there is a
trade-o¤ between high e¤ort and signicant labor market tightness, the competition
to attract workers not only misdirects an individual rms decision, but also interferes
with other rmsdecisions. We call this the negative externality e¤ect.
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Although both the misdirected e¤ect and the negative externality e¤ect can in-
uence welfare, the marginal benets from mitigating the negative externality e¤ect
is almost 0 when the labor market tightness tax rate is close to 0. Because labor
market tightness is chosen to maximize the utility of unemployed workers under a
competitive search equilibrium, the marginal changes in labor market tightness can-
not lower the utility of unemployed workers very much and, therefore, cannot counter
the negative externality e¤ect. However, because the trade-o¤ between e¤ort and
labor market tightness exists, even when the tax rate is 0, small changes in labor
market tightness can lower the misdirected e¤ect. Because of the misdirected e¤ect,
we show that a slight increase in labor market tightness tax under the competitive
search equilibrium can improve welfare.
Note that the notion of misdirected e¤ect is entirely novel. On the one hand,
because the standard e¢ ciency wage model focuses on the incentive role of wage pay-
ment, it ignores the advertisement role of the wage contract. Hence, although the
negative externality e¤ect exists in a standard e¢ ciency wage model, the misdirected
e¤ect does not. On the other hand, because the standard competitive search model
does not include any interaction between the incentive scheme and market competi-
tion, the competition to attract unemployed workers does not distort the incentive
to increase ex post surplus. Hence, there is neither a misdirected e¤ect nor a neg-
ative externality e¤ect. To our knowledge, this is the rst study to point out the
importance of this misdirected e¤ect.
We also show that if a trade-o¤ between high e¤ort and signicant labor market
tightness is severe, there is bargaining power under which a search model with wage
bargaining can attain a larger social surplus than the competitive search model. This
is surprising because it is well known that welfare under a search model with wage
bargaining cannot be greater than that in a standard competitive search model. This
result indicates that the misdirection of the competitive wage setting may be quite
large when the wage must play not only the role of advertisement, but also that of
an incentive.
Finally, we show that if an up-front fee is acceptable, the equilibrium contract can
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always attain the rst best. In particular, if up-front fees are acceptable, workers
are willing to pay these fees if the rm promises a su¢ ciently high wage when they
succeed in investing in match-specic human capital. This is feasible because if this
rearrangement induces optimal e¤ort, it can generate greater surplus. In other words,
we can consider up-front fees as a transfer mechanism from ex ante surplus to ex post
surplus to motivate workers to make an e¤ort. If this transfer mechanism exists,
the wage contract that maximizes unemployed workers also maximizes social welfare.
This suggests that the lack of a transfer mechanism because of limited liability is
necessary to derive our result.
Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) investigate an optimal contract under pri-
vate information in a competitive market. In particular, they examine whether a
decentralized economy can implement the constrained optimal allocation. Recently,
many studies introduce market friction and examine the private information in a
competitive search framework (e.g., Guerrieri (2008), Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright
(2010), and Delacroix and Shi (2013)). In particular, and similar to our analysis,
Guerrieri (2008) points out the importance of the negative externality through the en-
dogenous value of unemployed workers. She nds that the market allocation cannot
attain the constrained optimal because of the negative externality e¤ect. However,
unlike her model, we emphasize yet another source of ine¢ ciency, namely, the mis-
directed e¤ect, and show that only a slight increase in the labor market tightness
tax under the competitive search equilibrium can improve welfare because of this
misdirected e¤ect.
The literature on e¢ ciency wage models emphasizes a high wage as a device
to motivate workers (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and MacLeod and Malcomson
(1998)). Although most of the existing literature considers the situation where output
cannot be contractible, Moen and Rosén (2006) challenge this view and construct an
e¢ ciency wage model where output is contractible. However, when rms post the
contract, they do not take into account the trade-o¤ between labor market tightness
and the wage contract. Therefore, there is no trade-o¤ between advertisement and
incentive, and the posted wage contract is constrained e¢ cient.
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Later, Moen and Rosén (2011) explicitly consider the dual roles of the wage con-
tract as motivation and advertisement and analyze the equilibrium contract in a
competitive search model. However, because they pay more attention to the in-
terplay between macroeconomic variables and optimal wage contracts, they do not
investigate the ine¢ ciency resulting from these dual roles of the wage contract, which
is the main purpose of the present paper.
Masters (2011) analyzes how to provide a correct incentive to invest general human
capital in a competitive search model. He argues that if one can commit and advertise
the level of human capital and wages, e¢ cient allocation can prevail. Because human
capital is general and workers must invest before they meet jobs, there is no trade-o¤
between ex ante allocation and ex post incentive. If a rm can commit a particular
wage contract contingent on the level of human capital, they can provide a correct
incentive. We show that the results signicantly change if human capital is match
specic.
More recently, Tsuyuhara (2013) and Lamadon (2014) incorporate a moral hazard
problem when a rm must motivate workers to invest in match-specic human capital
in order to maintain their relationship in a competitive search framework. They also
allow for on-the-job search and derive an increasing wagetenure prole. However,
they do not analyze any welfare implications of their model. Abstracting from several
real-world elements, we identify a novel source of ine¢ ciency pertaining to the wage
contract that motivates workers to invest in match-specic human capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 analyzes the rms contract-posting problem given the market
value of unemployment. Section 4 endogenizes the utility of unemployed workers
and solves the market equilibrium. Section 5 analyzes the welfare and shows that
when a match-specic skill is critical, the equilibrium wage contract cannot even
attain the second best. We also discuss how the misdirected e¤ects distort welfare.
Section 6 compares the competitive search model from a search model with wage
bargaining and shows that there is some bargaining power under which the search
model with wage bargaining can improve welfare. Section 7 shows that if we can
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introduce up-front fees, the equilibrium contract can attain the rst best. The nal
section concludes and the appendix provides all necessary proofs.
2 Model
In this section, we construct an innite-horizon discrete-time competitive search
model with moral hazard. Firms post their wage contracts and unemployed workers
choose a particular submarket characterized by the posted wage contract . Once they
nd their partner, workers invest in match-specic human capital before production
takes place. If they succeed, they are able to produce yH while at the rm; if they
fail, they can only produce yL while at the rm, where yH > yL  0.
We assume that if workers fail to invest in match-specic human capital, they
are never able to succeed. This seemingly extreme assumption allows us to avoid
unnecessary complication of the model and helps clarify our main point. What is
important is that workerse¤ort choices have persistent impacts. When a match-
specic investment has a long-run impact, it changes the rent from maintaining their
relationship. Hence, it may be optimal for workers to walk away from the rm when
they fail to invest in match-specic human capital. Our assumption is designed to
capture this mechanism in the simplest possible way.
We describe the behavior of workers and rms at the production stage, an invest-
ment stage, and a search stage in order.
Production Stage: After making the investment, both a worker and the rm know
how much they can produce ( yH or yL ) from this relationship. Having this informa-
tion, they decide whether they will continue their relationship. The value from the
production relationship at tenure t with the match-specic human capital for workers
and rms, W pHt and J
p
Ht, and without the match-specic human capital for workers
and rms, W pLt and J
p
Lt, is dened as follows:
W pit = wit + 

U + (1  )W pit+1

;
Jpit = yi   wit + 





where i = H or L,  2 (0; 1) is an exogenous separation probability,  2 (0; 1) is a
discount factor, yi andwti are the productivity and wage payment for the type i worker
at tenure t, and U and V denote the sum of the discounted utilities of unemployed
workers and the sum of discounted prot ows from a vacant job, respectively.
Let us dene the rent to workers, Ri  W pi0 U , and the surplus from the match,
Si  Jpi0   V + Ri. Rearranging the equation, it is easy to see that we can express




[ (1  )]t [wit   (1  )U ] ; i = H;L; (1)
Si =
yi   (1  ) (U + V )
1   (1  ) ; i = H;L: (2)
Because investment takes place only in the initial period, the contract R =(RH ; RL)
contains all relevant information for the advertisement of the job and the incentive
scheme for investment. Hence, we focus below on how rms post R to attract and
motivate workers.
Investment Stage: During the investment stage, the workers invest in match-specic
human capital. We assume that they can obtain this capital with probability e 2 [0; 1]
and the monetary cost of the investment is c (e). We make the following standard
assumptions concerning the cost function.
Assumption 1: c0 (e) > 0; c00 (e) > 0, c (0) = 0, c0 (0) = 0 and c0 (1) =1.
Dene ~R (RL) = I (SL  RL)max fRL; 0g and ~J (RL) = I (RL  0)max fSL  RL; 0g,
where I (x  y) = 1 if x  y and I (x  y) = 0 if x < y. When workers fail to obtain
match-specic human capital, there are two possibilities in relation to the rm: to
continue the relationship or to separate. Provided that the rm prefers to maintain
their relationship, I (SL  RL) = 1, the worker can choose whether to continue the
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relationship or separate and obtain rent of max fRL; 0g. The value, ~R (RL) summa-
rizes the workers expected rent when he or she fails to obtain the skill. Similarly,
provided that the worker prefers to maintain the relationship, I (RL  0) = 1, the
rm can choose whether they can continue to maintain their relationship or separate,
which provides the rm with rent of max fSL  RL; 0g. This rms expected rent is
summarized by ~J (RL).
Using ~R (RL) and ~J (RL), the value of being employed workers and occupied jobs
before making a match-specic investment, W0 (R) and J0 (R), is dened as follows:
W0 (R)  e (R)RH + (1  e (R)) ~R (RL)  c (e (R)) + U;
J0 (R)  e (R) (SH  RH) + (1  e (R)) ~J (RL) + V;
e (R) = arg max
e2[0;1]
n
eRH + (1  e) ~R (RL)  c (e)
o
:
When a worker meets a job, the worker exerts e¤ort and maximizes expected rent
net of the cost of e¤ort. With probability e (R), the worker succeeds in obtaining
the match-specic human capital and the worker and the rm obtain rent RH and
SH   RH , respectively. With probability 1   e (R), the worker fails and obtains a
rent ~R (RL) and the rm obtains a rent ~J (RL).
By rearranging the denition of ~R (RL) and ~J (RL), we rewrite the rent to the
worker and the rmwhen the worker fails to obtain the skill as ~R (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)RL
and ~J (RL) = I (SL  RL  0) (SL  RL), where I (SL  RL  0) = 1 if RL 2 [0; SL],
and I (SL  RL  0) = 0 otherwise. This shows that as long as the rent to the failed
workers, RL, is between SL and 0, the worker obtains rent, RL, and the rm obtains
the remaining surplus, SL  RL.
Let us dene the rent to workers and the surplus from this relationship before
undertaking match-specic investment by R0 (R)  W0 (R)   U and S0 (R) 
J0 (R)   V + R0 (R), respectively. Rearranging these equations, we rewrite the
investment stage as
R0 (R) = e (R)
h
RH   ~R (RL)
i
+ ~R (RL)  c (e (R)) ; (3)
S0 (R) = e (R)
h
SH   ~S (RL)
i
+ ~S (RL)  c (e (R)) ; (4)
c0 (e (R)) = RH   ~R (RL) ; (5)
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where ~S (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)SL and ~R (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)RL. Equations
(3) and (4) show that the rent to workers, R0 (R), (the surplus from the relation-
ship before making match-specic investment, S0 (R)) is the expected rent from the
investment, e (R)
h
RH   ~R (RL)
i
+ ~R (RL), (the expected surplus from the invest-
ment, e (R)
h
SH   ~S (RL)
i
+ ~S (RL)) minus the investment cost, c (e (R)). Equation
(5) shows that when the worker chooses an optimal e¤ort, the marginal rent from
exerting e¤ort, RH   ~R (RL), must be equal to the marginal cost of exerting e¤ort,
c0 (e (R)). Because the marginal rents depend only on the di¤erences between the
rent when the worker succeeds and that when the worker fails, the rm can inuence
workerse¤ort by creating appropriate di¤erences in rent for success and failure.
Search Stage: There are many submarkets in an economy and each submarket is
characterized by an o¤ered contract, R. Assume that the amount of labor force is
normalized to 1. As usual, we assume that there exists a constant returns to scale
matching function, M (v (R) ; u (R)) for each submarket. Using this matching func-
tion, the probability for an available job to meet an unemployed worker is dened by







, where  (R) = v(R)
u(R)
. We make the following
standard assumption on this function q ().
Assumption 2: q () 2 [0; 1], q ()  2 [0; 1], q0()
q()
2 ( 1; 0), q00 () < 0, q (0) = 1,
q (1) = 0 and lim!0 q0()q() = 0.
Using the q function, the probability for a worker to meet a job in the submarket
R can be expressed as p ( (R)) = M(v(R);u(R))
u(R)
= q ( (R))  (R). Our assumption on
q () function ensures the following property of p function: p () 2 [0; 1], p0 () > 0;
p00 () < 0, p (0) = 0, p (1) = 1, p0 (0) = 1, and p0 (1) = 0. We rst describe the
behavior of unemployed workers and later we describe the behavior of the rm.
Unemployed workers must choose a submarket where they search for a job from
the set of o¤ered contracts, %. Suppose that the unemployed worker chooses a
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submarket with R 2 %. During the search stage, unemployed workers obtain zero-
ow utility and after spending for one period, the unemployed workers nd a job




U (R) ; (6)
where U (R) =  [p ( (R))R0 (R) + U ] ; (7)
and  (R) must satisfy the following conditions:
U   U (R)
 (R)
= 0; U  U (R) ; 8R. (8)
This condition ensures that workers do not apply for a submarket with rent R (even
o¤ the equilibrium path) unless it provides them with utility at least equal to U.
Firms must post a contract R before they start searching for workers. The
rm must pay a search cost k > 0 during this search period and nd a worker
with probability q ( (R)) after one period. When the rm posts the contract, the
rm must take into account not only how much the contract attracts unemployed
workers, but also the incentive compatibility condition of workers to invest. The
rms contract-posting problem is formulated as follows:
% = arg max
R2R2
fq ( (R)) [S0 (R) R0 (R)]  kg ; s:t: equation (5): (9)
Because rms can freely enter the market until their expected prots become 0, the
following zero-prot condition must also be satised in the equilibrium:
V  q ( (R)) [S0 (R) R0 (R)]  k = 0;8R 2 %: (10)
Finally, under a stationary environment, the market value of unemployment, U ,
must be equal to the highest value of unemployment, U:
U = U: (11)
We can now formally dene the competitive search equilibrium with an incentive
contract.
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Denition 1 A competitive search equilibrium with an incentive contract can be writ-
ten as an allocation f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug that satises the following property.
1. Unemployed workers optimally apply for a job: (6), (7) and (8).
2. Firms maximize their prots subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) con-
straint and satisfy the zero-prot condition: (5), (9), and (10).
3. The market value of unemployment must be the highest value of unemployment
under a stationary equilibrium: (11).
As Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a) and Guerrieri (2008) show, this problem can be
expressed as a rather simple constrained maximization problem and an equilibrium
condition.
Proposition 2 f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug with  =  (R) ; e = e (R) and R 2 % is a
competitive search equilibrium, if and only if,
1. for given U , (; e;R) solves




s:t: c0 (e) = RH   ~R (RL)
k  q () (S0 (R) R0 (R)) ; equality if  > 0;
where S0 (R)  e

SH   ~S (RL)

+ ~S (RL)  c (e), R0 (R)  e
h
RH   ~R (RL)
i
+
~R (RL)   c (e), ~S (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)SL, ~R (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)RL,
p () = q () , and Si =
yi (1 )U
1 (1 ) , for i = H;L.
2. the market value of unemployment, U , must satisfy the equilibrium condition,
U = U (U).
Although this constrained maximization problem is similar to the standard moral
hazard problem, there are two main di¤erences. First, unlike the standard moral
hazard problem, a principal can choose a labor market condition, , and, therefore,
13
the probability of match. Second, because the equilibrium condition endogenously
determines this market value of unemployment, there are general equilibrium e¤ects
that inuence the outcomes of the model. Because of these di¤erences, we show that
the model can induce ine¢ ciencies that do not appear in the standard moral hazard
problem.
3 The Firms Contract-posting Problem
In this section, we analyze a rms contract-posting problem given U . We endogenize
U in the following section. Note that by substituting the IC constraint into R0 (R),
we can eliminate RH . Hence, we simplify the rms contract-posting problem as
follows:




ec0 (e) + ~R (RL)  c (e)
i
1  
subject to the following zero-protIC constraint:








~S (RL)  ~R (RL)
i
; with equality if  > 0.
(12)










~S (RL)  ~R (RL)
i
> k for some
e 2 (0; 1) and RL 2 R.
The following lemma provides a condition whereby assumption 3 can be feasible.
Lemma 3 yH




, we can nd








~S (RL)  ~R (RL)
o
.
Lemma 3 shows that assumption 3 is feasible if and only if yH
1  > U . We assume
yH
1  > U in this section, but later show that in fact an equilibrium value of U also
satises this assumption.
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Let e, , and RL denote the solutions to this contract-posting problem. The
following lemma is useful for analyzing our model.
Lemma 4 For any given U < yH
1  , (
; RL; e
) has the following properties.
1. There exist  <1 such that  2  0; .
2. If SL > 0, RL 2 [0; SL]. If SL  0, the solution is independent of RL.
3. e 2 (0; 1) and d(S0 R0)
de
je=e = SH   S^L   c0 (e)  ec00 (e) < 0.
This lemma 4 shows that  is interior and therefore, the zero-protIC con-
straint is binding. Hence, without loss of generality, we examine the binded zero-
protIC constraint below. It also shows that as far as there is a surplus to share,
it is optimal for a rm to o¤er the rent that makes it possible to maintain their
relationship. Using this lemma, ~S (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)SL = I (SL  0)SL
and ~R (RL) = I (SL  RL  0)RL = I (SL  0)RL 2 [0; I (SL  0)SL]. Dene




. Because choosing R^L is
equivalent to choosing RL, we will consider R^L as a choice variable below.
Finally, this lemma 4 shows that e is interior and when a rm optimally chooses
e, a slight increase in e must lower the rms ex post prots. Although an increase
in e raises the rms expected surplus, it also increases the expected rent to workers.
Hence, the overall impact of an increase in e on expected prots is generally ambigu-
ous. The lemma 4 shows that when a rm optimally encourages a workers e¤ort,
the second e¤ect must dominate the rst e¤ect in the equilibrium. To understand
the intuition, suppose that an increase in e from an optimal e¤ort e raises a rms ex
post prot. This invites more rms to enter and provide more job opportunities and
increases the probability of unemployed workers nding a job. Hence, raising e un-
ambiguously increases the value of unemployment, which contradicts the assumption
that e is an optimal e¤ort.
Using lemma 4, an original contract-posting problem can be rewritten as the
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following further simplied problem:
U (U) = max
e2[0;1];R^L2[0;S^L];2[0;]
p ()S0   k
1   ; (13)















+ S^L   c (e), S^L = I (SL  0)SL; and Si =
yi (1 )U
1 (1 ) for i = H or L.
Because k is a search cost, k = vk
u
is the total search cost per unemployed
worker. Therefore, a new problem shows that the rms contract-posting problem is
equivalent to maximizing an ex ante net surplus per unemployed worker subject to
the zero-protIC constraint (equation (14)).
Note that the objective function is continuous and the choice set is closed and
bounded in this revised problem. Hence, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 5 For any given U < yH
1  , there exists a solution to the rms contract-
posting problem.
To understand this property of the rms contract-posting problem, we rst ana-
lyze optimal e¤ort and labor market tightness given U . For this purpose, we consider





p ()S0   k
1   ;




+ S^L   c (e). The rst-order conditions are









Sbest0 = k; (16)










Equation (15) shows that an optimal e¤ort equates the marginal cost of e¤ort to
the marginal surplus from exerting e¤ort where the marginal surplus is the di¤erence




that satises the rst-order condition and






in surplus between when a worker obtains and does not obtain match-specic human
capital. Note that this equation does not depend on the labor market tightness.
Hence, irrespective of the market condition, a planner can choose a unique ebest for
any given U .
Equation (16) shows that optimal labor market tightness equates the marginal
benets of labor market tightness to search cost. Because equation (15) uniquely
determines ebest, there is a unique Sbest0 and, therefore, equation (16) can uniquely

























, which is a percentage increase in workersprobability
to nd a job by a percentage increase in , are equal to the private contributions from
an increase in , 1  Rbest0
Sbest0
, which is the fraction of the rms rent in the surplus that
the rm obtains by posting its vacancy.
Dene R^bestL = SL  kq(best) . Because equation (16) can uniquely determine 
best
for any U < yH
1  , we can also uniquely identify R^
best
L for any U <
yH
1  . The following
lemma is useful for the characterization of the competitive search equilibrium.
Lemma 6 For any given U < yH
1  , there exists a unique S
c














fe [SH   ScL] + ScL   c (e)g :
If SL  ScL, R^bestL  0, and if SL < ScL, R^bestL < 0.




. This lemma shows that there exists a cuto¤ point of
SL below which R^bestL is infeasible. Using this lemma, we prove that the following
proposition characterizes the solutions to the rms contract-posting problem.
Proposition 7 For any given U < yH
1  ,
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1. if SL  ScL, then e = ebest,  = best, and R^L = R^bestL .
2. if SL < ScL, then e
 < ebest,  < best, and R^L = 0. Moreover, if 2c
00 (e) +
ec000 (e)  0, the solution is unique.
To understand the intuition behind this proposition, let us examine whether 
ebest; best

























to satisfy the zero-protIC condition, R^L must be equal to




, this is possible if and only if SL  ScL. Note that
when R^bestL is feasible, the wage contracts can handle both the incentive role and the















 : (0 Prot-IC)
This shows that RH   R^bestL can be chosen to induce ebest; R^bestL can be chosen to
target best. Hence, it is possible to attain an optimal e¤ort and optimal labor
market tightness at the same time.
On the other hand, if SL < ScL, R^
best
L < 0. Hence, it is impossible to induce an
optimal e¤ort. The largest possible punishment for failed workers is to set R^L = 0.
Hence, the IC constraint and the zero-protIC constraint become





e (SH   SL   c0 (e)) + S^L
i : (0 Prot - IC)
As this shows, RH must deal with both e and 
. That is, the rm must choose RH
to balance the consideration of incentive and advertisement. As a result, both the
equilibrium e¤ort and the labor market tightness are less than what is optimal.
Because ScL > 0, the following corollary is immediate.
18
Corollary 8 For any given U < yH
1  , if SL < 0, then e
 < ebest,  < best, and
separation occurs when a workers investment fails. Moreover, if 2c00 (e)+ec000 (e)  0,
the solution is unique.
When SL < 0, there is no reason for the rm to maintain a relationship when a
worker fails to obtain match-specic human capital. Hence, they decide to separate.
Both the equilibrium e¤ort and the labor market tightness are less than what is
optimal and the uniqueness is guaranteed by the same condition as before. Hence,
we make the further additional assumption to ensure uniqueness below.
Assumption 4: 2c00 (e) + ec000 (e)  0.
4 General Equilibrium
So far, we have analyzed the model for any given U < yH
1  . However, the equilibrium
condition must endogenously determine U . In this section, we analyze the equilibrium
condition and summarize the characterizations of the competitive search equilibrium.
First, the following theorem proves the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.





that satises U = U (U).
Because U is an endogenous variable in the general equilibrium, SL is also an
endogenous variable. Hence, we must restate proposition 7 and corollary 8. The
following theorem summarizes the characterizations of the model.
Theorem 10 There exist unique ycL 2 (yccL ; yH) and yccL 2 (0; ycL), where
1. for all yL 2 [ycL; yH), e = ebest,  = best, and RL = RbestL  0.
2. for all yL 2 [yccL ; ycL), e < ebest,  < best, and RL = 0.
3. for all yL 2 [0; yccL ), e < ebest,  < best, and separation occurs when a workers
investment fails.
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We measure the criticality of match-specic human capital for production by the
level of yL. If yL is large, the job can be productive without the match-specic human
capital. Hence, the match-specic human capital is not critical. In contrast, a small
yL means that the productivity of jobs without the match-specic human capital is
fairly small. That is, the match-specic human capital is critical.
The theorem shows that if match-specic human capital is not critical for produc-
tion, the contract can induce optimal e¤ort and optimal labor market tightness where
optimal means that it maximizes the ex ante net surplus of unemployed workers.
However, if it is critical, the e¤ort and labor market tightness are lower than
optimal. There are two possibilities. If yL 2 [yccL ; ycL), they can maintain their
relationship. But because a rm o¤ers RL = 0, a worker does not obtain any rent
from this relationship. If yL < yccL , they decide to separate. Hence, the value of
employed workers who fail to obtain match-specic human capital is the same as the
value of unemployed workers in both cases. In other words, the equilibrium contract
coincides with a version of an e¢ ciency wage contract.
5 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze the welfare property of the competitive search equilibrium.




as an e¤ort level and labor market tight-
ness that maximize unconstrained ex ante net surplus per unemployed worker. This
is potentially a good welfare criterion for a partial equilibrium analysis. However,
once we wish to consider social welfare for a whole economy, this criterion may not
be appropriate because the economy consists not only of unemployed workers, but
also employed workers. The social planner must then take into account resource
constraints in society and maximize a reasonable social welfare function.
First, we describe the resource constraints in an economy. Let nBH;t and n
E
H;t
denote the fraction of workers who succeed in obtaining the match-specic human
capital at the beginning and the end of date t, respectively. Similarly, let nBL;t and n
E
L;t
denote the fraction of workers who fail to obtain the match-specic human capital at
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the beginning and the end of date t, and uBt and u
E
t denote the fraction of unemployed
workers at the beginning and the end of date t, respectively. Finally, let nB0t denote
the fraction of matched workers who have not yet invested in match-specic human
capital at the beginning of date t. The following dynamics of employment status
summarize the resource constraints in an economy:
nBH;t+1 = (1  )nEH;t; nBL;t+1 = (1  )nEL;t; nB0;t+1 = p (t)uEt ; (17)













L;t = xt (1  et)nB0;t + nBL;t; (19)
uEt = (1  xt) (1  et)nB0;t + uBt ; (20)
where xt 2 [0; 1] is the probability that maintains their relationship when a worker
fails to obtain match-specic human capital. When the fraction of employed workers
with and without the match-specic human capital is nEH;t and n
E
L;t at the end of date
t, (1  ) portion of them can maintain their status and  portion of them become
unemployed at the beginning of date t+1. When the fraction of unemployed workers
is uEt at the end of date t, 1   p () portion of them remain unemployed and p ()
portion of them nd a potential new job at the beginning of date t + 1. These
dynamics are described in equations (17) and (18). When the fraction of potential
employees at the beginning of date t is nB0t, et portion of them succeed in obtaining the





H;t becomes the fraction of employed workers with the match-specic human
capital at the end of date t, xt (1  et)nB0;t + nBL;t becomes the fraction of employed
without it, and (1  xt) (1  et)nB0;t+uBt becomes the fraction of unemployed workers
at the end of date t. Equations (19) and (20) formally describe these processes.
We assume that a social planner maximizes the sum of the discounted stream of
net output, where the net output consists of aggregate output, yHnEH;t+ yLn
E
L;t minus





















. The planners rst-best
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8<: yHnEH;t + yLnEL;t   ktuEt c (et)nB0;t + Y F  NBt+1
9=; ; (21)
subject to equations (17), (18), (19), and (20). Dene a function Si (U)  yi (1 )U1 (1 )
where i = H or L and S^L (U) = I (SL (U)  0)SL (U). The following lemma is
useful to understand the property of the social planner problem.







































  S^L  UF + S^L  UF   c (e)o :
We would like to compare the rst-best problem and the solution to the compet-
itive search equilibrium. The following lemma makes the comparison easier.
Lemma 12 The solutions to the competitive search equilibrium are equivalent to the
solutions to the following problem:
U = max
2[0;]
p () S0 (; U
)  k





) + (1  e) S^L (U)  c (e)
o
;












Set et = e (
; U), t = 
 (U), and xt = I (SL (U)  0), where e (; ),  ()
and U are solutions to the problem (22). Evaluate the welfare under a compet-




, by the value function in equation (21) without
maximization, together with resource constraints (17), (18), (19), and (20). It can









 (U) ; U)nB0;t+U
, where S0 (; ),  (), and U are the solutions
to the problem (22). Hence, it is apparent from lemma 11 and lemma 12 that the
only di¤erence between the rst-best problem and the competitive search equilibrium
is the existence of the zero-protIC constraint in the competitive search equilibrium.
From the results from theorem 10, the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 13 There exists ycL such that
1. for all yL  ycL, e and  in the rst-best and the competitive search equilibrium
are the same.
2. for all yL < ycL, e and  are lower in the competitive search equilibrium than
those in the rst-best equilibrium.
When yL  ycL, because a rm can arbitrarily adjust R^L, the zero-protIC con-
straint does not cause any meaningful restriction on the choice of e¤ort and labor
market tightness. However, when yL < ycL, R^L = 0. Hence, the zero-protIC









. Note that the
total di¤erentiation of this equation shows @
@e
< 0. That is, the zero-protIC con-
straint causes a trade-o¤ between the e¤ort and the workersprobability of nding
a job; namely, a rm must pay a higher wage to induce greater e¤ort. However,
because the promise of a high wage reduces the rmsprots, only a small number
of rms can enter the market, which reduces labor market tightness and, therefore,
the unemployed workersprobability of nding a job. That is, when yL < ycL, it is
impossible to increase both e and p () at the same time.
It is natural to ask whether a planner can attain a better allocation than that under
the competitive search equilibrium when the zero-protIC constraint is satised. To
examine this question, we assume that a planner can tax labor market tightness at
the rate  and nance unemployment benets z. That is, we substitute U (R) = z 
 (R) + [p ( (R))R0 (R) + U ] for equation (7) and impose a budget constraint z =

R
 (R) dQ (R) as an additional constraint, where Q is an equilibrium distribution
of R. This labor market tightness tax is designed to clarify the main source of
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ine¢ ciency in the competitive search model. The only role of this tax is to lead
unemployed workers to choose that labor market with less labor market tightness
than that in the competitive search equilibrium. We show that a slight increase in
labor market tightness tax from zero can improve welfare.
Using the same argument as before, the welfare under the competitive search






 )nBH;t + SL (U
 )nBL;t + S0 (
 ;U  )nB0;t + U
 ;
where S0 (; ),  , and U  are the solutions to
U  = U^ ( ; U  )  p (
 )S0 (
 ;U  )  k
1   ;
 =  ( ; U  )  arg max
2[0;]
z    + p () S0 (;U  )  k
1   ;
S0 (;U





 )  S^L (U  )

+ S^L (U
 )  c (e)
o
;












Note that  maximizes ex ante surplus plus z 
1  , but  does not directly inuence
U  because the budget constraint imposes z =  . Therefore,  can inuence welfare
only through the changes in  .





that satises B (U  )  U  U^ ( ( ; U  ) ; U  ) =







= [(C:S:) + (M:D:) + (N:E:)]





1   (1  )
@U^( ;U )
@





 )  S^L (U  )  c0 (e )







(N:E:) = nB0;t [SH (U
 )  SL (U  )  c0 (e )] @e (




B0 (U  )
 0;
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B0(U ) > 0,
@(;U)
@





 0 with a strict inequality if e < ebest.
Proposition 14 shows that a rise in  lowers labor market tightness,  and that
the reduction in  has three di¤erent e¤ects on welfare.










 0, (C:S:) is nonnegative and, therefore,  can reduce
social welfare through (C:S:). If e = ebest, then SH (U  )   SL (U  ) = c0 (e ) and
(M:D:) = (N:E:) = 0. In this case,
dY ( :NBt )
d





Hence, if e = ebest, the competitive search equilibrium (  = 0 ) maximizes social
welfare.
If e < ebest, then SH (U  )   S^L (U  ) > c0 (e ) and a planner must consider two
di¤erent e¤ects. The second term, (M:D:), represents the impact of a change in 
on the ex post surplus, S0 (
 ; U  ), through @e(
 ;U )
@
, because when e < ebest, the









> 0, if e < ebest, then (M:D:) is
negative. This means that an increase in  increases welfare through (M:D:).
The intuition can be understood by the following logic. When e < ebest, the rm
can encourage greater e¤ort by providing more rent to successful workers. However,
because transferring rent to workers reduces prots, the number of posted job o¤ers
will be lower. This lowers the job-nding probability of unemployed workers and
thus lowers the value of unemployed workers. Hence, this type of submarket cannot
survive in a competitive economy. Thus, when a wage must play an advertisement
and an incentive role at the same time, the competition to attract workers forces
rms to o¤er a wage to improve the ex ante utility of workers at the expense of
their ex post utility. We refer to this as misdirected e¤ect. By leading unemployed
workers to choose a labor market with less labor market tightness than that under the
competitive search equilibrium, a planner can mitigate the misdirected e¤ect. This
is why an increase in  increases welfare through (M:D:).
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The third term, (N:E), represents the e¤ect of changes in  on ex post surplus,
S0 (
 ; U  ) through @e(
 ;U )
@U
. Note that, when e < ebest, R^L = 0 and therefore, the
incentive compatibility condition becomes RH = c0 (e). Because a rise in U  lowers
the surplus from the relationship, a rm must reduce the rent to workers RH in order




means that increases in the utility of unemployed workers due to the competition to
attract workers make it costly for other rms to provide workers with appropriate
incentives. We call this a negative externality e¤ect. Because
@U^( ;U )
@
B0(U ) is positive,
if e < ebest, (N:E:) is negative. This means that an increase in  increases welfare
through (N:E:).




1  , when  = 0,









 )  S^L (U  )  c0 (e )
i @e ( ; U  )
@
@ ( ; U  )
@
> 0:
The result can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 15 Suppose that yL < ycL. A slight increase in  under a competitive
search equilibrium improves welfare because it mitigates the misdirected e¤ects.
The proposition shows that when match-specic human capital is critical, the
competition to attract workers obliges rms to o¤er wage contracts that cause too
many rms to enter the market. A tax on labor market tightness mitigates this
distortion and improves welfare.
6 Competitive Search Model vs. Search Model
with Wage Bargaining
In this section, we compare the welfare under a competitive search model and a
search model with wage bargaining. As far as a competitive search model attains
the constrained optimal, the welfare under a search model with wage bargaining
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that faces the same constraint cannot be greater than that under the competitive
search model. However, because the competitive search model can fail to attain the
constrained optimal in our model, there is an opportunity for a search model with
wage bargaining to improve social welfare. We examine this possibility.
Following the standard assumption on a search model with wage bargaining, we
assume that RH and RL can be determined by a generalized Nash bargaining: RH =
SH (U) and RL = SL (U), where  is the bargaining power of workers. Note
that this wage determination policy leads to ~R (RL) = I (SL (U)  RL  0)RL =
S^L (U) and ~S (RL) = I (SL (U)  RL  0)SL (U) = S^L (U). Hence, the following







SH (U)  S^L (U)

: (25)









24 eB (; U)SH (U)  S^L (U)  c0  eB (; U)
+S^L (U)  S^L (U)
35 : (26)
















































1  eB  ; UB S^L  UB  c  eB  ; UB ;
where eB (; U) satises equation (25) and B (; U) satises (26). The following
proposition shows that it is possible for a search model with wage bargaining to
attain higher welfare than the competitive search model.
Proposition 16 For all yL < yccL , there exists , which attains higher welfare than
that under the competitive search equilibrium.
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The intuition of the proof can be explained as follows. When yL < yccL , the














= RH where R

H is the solution to the competitive search equilibrium.
Because we know that a planner can improve welfare by slightly lowering  and
increasing e from the competitive search equilibrium, we can nd  =  + " where
" > 0, under which a search model with wage bargaining improves welfare.
7 Up-Front Fees
In this section, we show that when we allow up-front fees, the competitive search
equilibrium can always attain the rst-best equilibrium. This exercise claries the
role of limited liability in deriving our results.
Suppose that a worker must pay up-front fees, wf  0, to the matched rm before
investing in the match-specic human capital. Then the value of being employed
workers and occupied jobs before making match-specic investment can be modied
as follows:
W0 (R)  e (R)RH + (1  e (R)) ~R (RL)  c (e (R))  wf + U;
J0 (R)  e (R) (SH  RH) + (1  e (R)) ~J (RL) + wf + V;
where e (R) = argmaxe
n
eRH + (1  e) ~R (RL)  c (e)
o
. Following the same steps
as above, we can rewrite our contract-posting problem as follows:
U = max
e2[0;1];R^L2[0;S^L];2[0;];wf0




SH (U)  S^L (U)
i
+ S^L (U)  c (e) ;




SH (U)  S^L (U)  c0 (e)
i
+ S^L (U)  R^L + wf
o
:
Now, a rm has an additional choice variable, wf  0. Hence, it is accurate that
even if R^L = 0, a rm can choose wf > 0 and induce an optimal e¤ort and an optimal
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S^L (U) + wf
 : (zero-protIC)
Following this observation, we can now safely claim the following proposition.
Proposition 17 If a rm can charge up-front fees, the competitive search model can
always induce an optimal e¤ort and an optimal labor market tightness.
If up-front fees are acceptable, workers are willing to pay the fees if the rm
promises a su¢ ciently high wage when they succeed in investing in match-specic
human capital. This is feasible because if this rearrangement induces optimal e¤ort,
it can generate greater surplus. In other words, up-front fees can be considered as
a transfer mechanism from ex ante surplus to ex post surplus to motivate workers to
exert an e¤ort. If this transfer mechanism exists, the wage contract that maximizes
unemployed workers also maximizes social welfare. This result indicates that the
lack of the transfer mechanism because of limited liability is necessary to derive our
results.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzes an equilibrium wage contract when a rm must motivate workers
to invest in match-specic human capital in a competitive search model. We examine
when and how the dual roles of a wage contract, advertisement and motivation,
interact with each other. Our model identies a novel source of ine¢ ciency, which
we call misdirected e¤ect : when a wage must play two di¤erent roles, the competition
to attract workers forces a wage to be chosen to increase the ex ante utility of workers
at the expense of ex post utility, which induces too many job openings and makes
it unprotable for rms to pay a higher wage to motivate workers. Because of this
e¤ect, a competitive search model cannot attain the constrained optimum. We also
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show that there are possibilities that a search model with ex post bargaining can
improve welfare.
The paper also suggests that entry fees can be a possible solution to the problem.
For this exercise, we implicitly assume that there is no liquidity constraint and they
can pay fees in advance. This may not be feasible in reality4. One possible solution
may be implicit bonding, such as deferred or seniority wages, as in Lazear (1979).
This could serve as a criticism of an e¢ ciency wage because the implicit bonding
eliminates unemployed workers. But because of search friction, the unemployed
worker still exists under a seniority wage scheme in our model. Hence, our model
can be consistent with the coexistence of seniority wages and unemployed workers in
the same market.
Nevertheless, note that seniority wages serve as a solution only if the accumulation
of match-specic human capital takes some time. If workers can quickly accumulate
match-specic human capital, lower payments to workers when they are young may
not be enough to cover all required up-front fees to attain the rst-best allocation.
In this case, we literally need up-front fees to solve the ine¢ ciency addressed in
this paper. We allowed only an initial investment in skill to make this point clear.
The dynamic accumulation of match-specic human capital may be interesting for a
quantitative assessment of deferred wages, which is left for our future research.
9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: We rst show the following lemma. Then, we show
that the competitive search equilibrium solves the constrained maximization problem.
Later we prove the opposite direction.
Lemma 18 Suppose that f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug is the competitive search equilibrium,
then U (R) = p((R))R0(R)
1  .
Proof. DeneR = argmaxR2% U (R). Then it is easy to see thatR = argmaxR2%
p((R))R0(R)
1  .
4Guerrieri (2008) explicitly considers a feasibility constraint for up-front fees in her model
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Because U = U on the equilibrium,
U =  [p ( (R))R0 (R) + U ] =
p ( (R))R0 (R)
1   = maxR2%
p ( (R))R0 (R)
1   :
For any R, it is easy to check that U
 U(R)
(R)





Necessity: Let f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug be a competitive search equilibrium with R 2
%,  =  (R), and e = e (R). We must prove that fR; ; eg solves the con-
strained optimization problem. Because it satises the zero-prot condition and the
IC condition,
k = q () (S0  R0) ; RH   ~R (RL) = c0 (e (R)) = c0 (e) ;
where S0  e

SH   ~S (RL)

+ ~S (RL) c (e) andR0  e
h
RH   ~R (RL)
i
+ ~R (RL) 
c (e). Suppose that another triple fR; ; eg satises the IC condition and achieves








RH   ~R (RL)
i
+ ~R (RL)  c (e)
o
1   :
We shall prove that it must violate the zero-prot condition. Take thisR =(RH ; RL)
and consider f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug. Because both e (R) and e satisfy the IC condition,
e (R) = e. Hence, optimal application implies that






RH   ~R (RL)
i
+ ~R (RL)  c (e)
o
1   :
This implies that  >  (R)  0. Therefore,
q () [S0  R0] < q ( (R)) [S0  R0] = q ( (R)) [S0 (R) R0 (R)] = k:
Because  > 0, this violates the zero-prot condition.
Su¢ ciency: We now prove by construction that for any solution fR; ; eg to the
constrained maximization problem, there is a solution to the competitive search equi-
librium f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug with % = fRg,  =  (R), and e = e (R). Let e (R)




and choose  (R) to satisfy U =
p((R))fe(R)[RH  ~R(RL)]+ ~R(RL) c(e(R))g
1  or  (R) =1 if
there is no solution to the equation. It is immediate that f (R) ; e (R) ; %; Ug satises
an optimal application. We now show that it also satises the zero-prot condition.
Suppose to the contrary that some triples fR0;  (R0) ; e (R0)g violate the zero-prot
condition. Because it implies that q ( (R0)) [S0 (R0) R0 (R0)] > k,  (R0) < 1.











R0H   ~R (R0L)
i










R0H   ~R (R0L)
i





R0; ~; e (R0)

attain a higher objective function than fR; ; eg. Contra-
diction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that yH
1  > U . ChooseRL < 0. Then e
h
SH   ~S (RL)  c0 (e)
i
+
~S (RL)  ~R (RL)

= e (SH   c0 (e)). Because yH1  > U , SH > 0. Therefore, be-
cause c0 (e) = RH 2 (0; SH), there exists e such that e (SH   c0 (e)) > 0. Therefore,




, e (SH   c0 (e)) > k. On the contrary, suppose
that yH









~S (RL)  ~R (RL)
i
= e [SH   c0 (e)]  0. There-
fore, it is impossible to nd e > 0 and RL 2 R that satisfy k < e [SH   c0 (e)] for all
k > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4:
1. Suppose there is no  < 1 such that   . Then  = 1. It violates the
zero-prot condition. Suppose  = 0. Then p (0) = 0 and U = 0. Take e > 0








~S (RL)  ~R (RL)
i
> k, and
choose  so that q () = k
[e[SH  ~S(RL) c0(e)]+( ~S(RL)  ~R(RL))]







= ec00 (e) > 0,
p()[ec0(e) c(e)+ ~R(RL)]
1  > 0 = U . This
contradicts the assumption that  = 0.
2. If SL > 0 and RL =2 [0; SL], then ~S (RL) = 0 and ~R (RL) = 0. Hence, (e; )
must satisfy U = p(
)[ec0(e) c(e)]
1  and k = q (
) e (SH   c0 (e)). It means













e 2 (0; 1), we can nd 0 >  such that q (0) = k[e(SH c0(e))+(1 e)SL] . Note
that U0 =
p(0)[ec0(e) c(e)]
1  > U . Contradiction. Suppose that SL  0.
Because I (SL  RL  0) = 0 for all RL, the result is obvious.
3. Let us rst show that e 2 (0; 1). Suppose that e = 1. Because c0 (1) =1, it
violates the zero-protIC condition. Suppose that e = 0. Then U = p(
)R^L
1 
and q () = k
[S^L R^L]
. Because yH > yL, SH > S^L. Hence, there exists " and
" > 
 such that q (") = k["(SH S^L c0("))+S^L R^L]
. But " > 
 implies that
p(")["c0(") c(")+R^L]
1  > U: Contradiction. Suppose that
d(S0 R0)
de
je=e > 0. Then
dq
de
je=e =   k(S0 R0)2
d(S0 R0)
de
je=e < 0. Therefore, if we dene ~p (q ()) = p (),
d~p(q)
de
je=e > 0 and dR0de = ec00 (e) > 0. This implies that a slight increase in e
from e improves the objective function. Contradiction. Q.E.D.







0 = maxe fe [SH   SL] + SL   c (e)g. If SL = 0, G (0) =
  k
q(best)




Hence, it can be shown that G (SH   ") >   q
0(best)best
q(best)




we can nd " such that G (SH   ") > 0. Therefore, there exists ScL 2 (0; SH). Note
that

















































Therefore, G0 (SL) > 0 and ScL is unique. The desired result follows from the deni-
tion of R^bestL . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition7: Before proving the proposition, we rst prove the following
lemma:
Lemma 19 e  ebest.
Proof. Suppose not. Because we know e 2 (0; 1), there exists e 2  ebest; 1, R^L 2h
0; S^L
i
and  2 0;  such that k = q () he SH   S^L   c0 (e)+ S^L   R^Li.




and SH   S^L < c0 (e). Suppose S^L =
R^L. Then q (
) = k
e[SH S^L c0(e)]
< 0. Contradiction. Hence, S^L > R^L. There-




such that q ()















+ S^L   c (e) 
h










+ S^L   c (e) :
Contradiction.
































This means that R^L = SL   kq(best) = R^
best
L . Because SL  ScL, R^bestL  0. That is,











this must be the solution to the problem.
SL< S
c
L: Suppose that SL 2 (0; ScL). Because we know e and  are interior, the
rst-order conditions must be characterized by
0 =
p0 ()S0je=e   k
1     q














; 2  0;
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the zero-protIC constraint, 1 is the mul-
tiplier for the nonnegative constraint of R^L, and 2 is the multiplier for the upper
bound constraint of R^L.
First, we show that e < ebest. Suppose not. Because e  ebest, e = ebest. Hence,
dS0
de
= 0. Because d(S0 R0)
de
je=e < 0,  = 0 from equation (29). This means that
p0 ()S0 = k from equation (28) and therefore, that 
 = best. Substituting e =
ebest and  = best into the (zero-protIC) constraint, we obtain R^L = S^L  kq(best) :
But this is not feasible. Contradiction.
Next, we show that R^L = 0. Suppose not. Then 1 = 0 and, therefore,
 = 2

 0. But because e < ebest, dS0
de
je=e > 0 and d(S0 R0)de je=e < 0. Hence,
 < 0 from equation (29). Contradiction.















je=e > 0 and d(S0 R0)de je=e < 0, the equation implies that k < p0 ()S0je=e.
By denition, S0  Sbest0 . Therefore,





Because p00 () < 0,  < best.
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Suppose that SL  0. Then S^L = R^L = 0 and the rst-order condition must be
characterized by equations (28) and (29). Applying the same argument as above,
e < ebest and  < best.
To prove the uniqueness of e and , let us dene D (e) and ~ (e), which satisfy
the following two equations:




























 [S0  R0] :
Note that when the rst-order conditions are satised, D (e) = 0. From the second







< 0. Substituting this into the
rst equation, we nd that
















Taking the derivative around D (e) = 0, we derive
D0 (e) jD(e)=0 = p0 () ~0 (e) dS0
de










+ [p0 ()S0je=e   k] ~00 (e) :
Note that dS0
de
je=e > 0, d2S0de2 je=e < 0, and p0 ()S0je=e > k. Hence, if ~
00
(e) < 0,

































Because we show that d
2(S0 R0)
de2
=   [2c00 (e) + ec000 (e)]  0, ~00 (e) < 0 and, therefore,
D0 (e) jD(e)=0 < 0. This means that if there exists e, it is unique. Given e,
q () = k
[S0 R0]je=e derives a unique 
. Because we know that there is a solution to
the original problem and the solution must satisfy D (e) = 0, this must be the unique
solution to the original problem. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 9: Dene F (U) = U   U (U). Because the objective function
of equation (13) is continuous and the choice set is compact, the theorem of maximum
implies that F (U) is continuous. Suppose U = yH "
1  , where " > 0. Then SH =
"
1 (1 ) . Because yH > yL, we can choose " so that
yL










are close to 0. That





> 0. Suppose U = 0. Note that the
contract-posting problem can be rewritten as




ec0 (e)  c (e) + R^L
i













where ~p (q ()) = p (). Because e > 0 for all U < yH
1  , it is easy to see that
U (0) > 0. Therefore, F (0) < 0. This proves the existence. Taking the derivative
of F with respect to U by using equation (30),






1   (1  ) [e
 + (1  e) I [SL  0]] > 0;
for all SL 6= 0. This proves the uniqueness of F (U) = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 10: Dene ycL (U) and U
 such that ScL =
ycL(U) (1 )U
(1 (1 )) and






, we can show 0 < (1  )U < ycL (U) < yH for any given yL. From
the denition of ycL (U
), and proposition 7 and corollary 8, if we can take U as given,
the desired result is immediate by setting yc = ycL (U
) and ycc = (1  )U. We have
to show that the result does not change even if we take into account the endogeneity
of U. Let us dene 1 (yL) = yL  (1  )U, 2 (yL) = yL ycL (U), F (U : yL) =
0, and G (ScL : U
) = 0, where F (U : yL) = U   U (U) and G (SL : U) = SL  
k
q(best)
. Because of 0 < (1  )U < ycL (U) < yH for any yL 2 (0; yH), it is clear
that 1 (0) < 0, 2 ((1  )U) < 0, 1 ((1  )U) > 0, and 2 (yH   ") > 0 for
small " > 0. Because 1 (yL), 2 (yL), F (U : yL) and G (SL : U) are continuous,
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and ycc = (1  )U 2 (0; ycL (U)).
To obtain the desired results, we need to prove 01 (yL) > 0 and 
0
2 (yL) > 0. Note
that




02 (yL) = 1 

1 + (1   (1  )) dS
c
L





We can show that
d (1  )U
dyL

















2 (0; 1) :
This proves 01 (yL) > 0. Because p
0  bestmaxe fe [SH   ScL] + ScL   c (e)g = k, we
can also show that
dScL
d (1  )U jSL=ScL =  
1
(1  )
GU (SL : U) jSL=ScL


















1 + (1   (1  )) dS
c
L





















> 0. Hence, 1+(1   (1  )) dScL
d(1 )U jSL=ScL 2
(0; 1). Therefore, 02 (yL) > 0; and the desired results follow. Q.E.D.
















































where T FEH  yH + 

T FBH (1  ) + UFB

, T FEL  yL + 

T FBL (1  ) + UFB

,




T FB0 p () + U
FB (1  p ())  k	, and
max
e;x
 c (et)nB0;t + T FEH nEH;t + T FEL nEL;t + UFEuEt 	
=
8<: T FEH nBH;t + T FEL nBL;t + UFEuBt+maxe;x etT FEH + (1  et) xtT FEL + (1  xt)UFE  c (et)	nB0;t
9=; :






T FBi = yi + 

(1  )T FBi + UFB

; i = H;L;









L + (1  xt)UFB






T FB0 p () + U
FB (1  p ())  k	 :
Because the Bellman equation is a contraction mapping, the solution to this equation
must be a unique solution to the original Bellman equation. Dene SFi = T
FB
i  UFB
and UF = UFB. Then we can nd SFi =
yi (1 )UF







H + (1  et)xtSFL   c (et)
	
and UF = max
p()SF0  k
1  . Note that xt = 1
if and only if SFL  0. The desired results follow. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 12: Let
n
e+; R^+L ; 
+; U+
o
be a solution to the contract-posting











be a solution to the maximization problem in
the problem (22) for any given U . Suppose that there exists
n
e+; R^+L ; 
+; U+
o
that does not solve the maximization problem of (22). This means that becausen
e+; R^+L ; 
+
o








SH (U)  S^L (U)
i













SH (U)  S^L (U)
i






p ()S0 (; U)  k
1   = U
++:
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that does not solve the maximization problem in a competitive search equilibrium.















e+; R^+L ; 
+; U+
o


























+ S^L   c (e+)
i
  +k
1   = U
:
Contradiction. Because e+; R^+L , and 
+ are unique for any U < yH
1  ,
n














for any U < yH
1  . Hence, the equivalence must
also hold for the value of the unemployed under the competitive search equilibrium.
Because we know the competitive search equilibrium has a unique solution, the de-
sired results follow. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 14: Because the objective function is continuous and the
choice set is compact, the theorem of maximum implies that S0 (; U) is contin-
uous in  and U . The theorem of maximum also implies that  ( ; U) is upper
hemicontinuous. Given the assumption of 2c00 (e) + ec000 (e), the same argument for
proposition 7 shows that  ( ; U) is single valued. Hence,  ( ; U) is continuous.
It means that B (U) is continuous. Suppose U = yH "
1  , where " > 0. Then
SH =
"
1 (1 ) . Because yH > yL, we can choose " so that
yL














1 (1 )   c (e ). As e 2 (0; 1) for any " > 0, we can
















> 0. Suppose U = 0. Similar to the argument with the proof of
theorem 9, it is clear that the contract-posting problem can be p((;U))R0(R)
1  > 0 for
any U . Therefore, B (0) < 0. This proves the existence.
Note that





















= S 0H (U) + (1  e ) S^ 0L (U) +
h
SH (U)  S^L (U)

  c0 (e)
i @e (; U)
@U
;








eS 0H (U) + (1  e) S^ 0L (U)
i
h




 0 with a strict inequality if e < ebest, and @U^(;U)
@U
< 0. Moreover,
because the rst-order condition with respect to  implies p0 ( )S0 (
 ; U  )   k +
p ( ) @S0(
 ;U )
@
=  , it can be shown that @U^(;U)
@
= 
1  . Hence, we can nd
^ 2 (0;1] such that, for any  < ^ ; B0 (U) > 0. This proves the uniqueness.














1 + S 0H (U









 )  S^SL (U  )  c0 (e (; U  ))
i @e (; U  )
@



























B0(U) , we can










B0(U) > 0. Finally, it is derived from
the rst-order condition with respect to , p0 ( )S0 (










p00 ()S0 (; U) + 2p0 ()
@S0(;U)
@









SH (U)  S^L (U)  c0 (e (; U))








SH (U)  S^L (U)  c0 (e (; U))
i @2e (; U)
@2



















SH (U)  S^L (U)  c0 (e)












; for some M > 0;
@e(;U)
@
 0 and @2e(;U)
@2






 0, and @(;U)
@
< 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 16: Let

; e; R^L; U















be the solution to the search
model with wage bargaining. Suppose that yL < yccL . Then R^

L = S^L (U
) = 0:Dene
 such that  = c
0(e)
SH(U)











 0, and @eB(;U)
@
> 0. We rst show that UB = U when  = 
and later show that for a small " > 0, the search model with wage bargaining with




















eB (; U) c0
 
eB (; U)
  c  eB (; U)+ S^L (U)i
1   ;






SH (U)  S^L (U)  c0 (eB (; U))

+ (1  ) S^L (U)
i :
















Consider the case U = U. Note that R^L = S^L (U


















eB (; U) c0
 
eB (; U)
  c  eB (; U)+ S^L (U)i
1  
=
~p (q ())  fec0 (e)  c (e)g
1   = U
;
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; U). This means that when
 = , the solutions to the search model with wage bargaining are the same as
the competitive search equilibrium, and that the search model with wage bargaining




j= = @Y B(Nt)@UB @U
B
@









































Therefore, for a small " > 0, the search model with wage bargaining under  + "
attains higher welfare than that with . Q.E.D.
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